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Using a unique dataset of corporate directors with monitoring skills who serve on mutual 
fund boards, we find that the presence of intense monitors on a fund’s board has considerable 
influence on its governance. Mutual funds with intense monitors, defined as directors who have been 
involved in a corporate CEO turnover event; have served on a firm’s audit committee for at least 
three years; or have served on the board of a firm with high–quality governance, as measured by the 
GIM index, exhibit higher managerial turnover–performance sensitivity. Moreover, we find that the 
outflow from institutional investors becomes less sensitive to a mutual fund’s poor performance in 
the presence of an intense monitor, thereby suggesting a substitution effect between external and 
internal governance mechanisms. We find some evidence that mutual fund boards with intense 
monitors exhibit lower negative return gaps, lower window–dressing activity, and higher stock 
holding horizons compared to mutual funds without such directors. Finally, we find that mutual fund 
boards with intense monitors overemphasize recent performance and sub–optimally terminate their 
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 1. Introduction 
It is [the] fund directors, not fund investors, who have access to the information 
and critical participants, like the fund adviser, that make strong and meaningful 
oversight possible. That is why the commitment and work of mutual fund directors 
is so important. 
-Mary Joe White, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair, 2016 
The existing literature on mutual fund governance has been inconclusive about the relevance 
of a fund’s board of directors to its governance quality. On the one hand, a number of studies have 
found that different governance measures, such as board size and independence, have very weak, 
if any, predictive power for the quality of a mutual fund’s governance (Del Guercio, Genc, and 
Tran 2018; Ferris and Yan 2007; Adams, Nishikawa, and Rao 2016). On the other hand, several 
studies have suggested that boards have significant effects on different attributes of mutual fund 
governance (Almazan et al 2004; Gil–Bazo and Ruiz–Verdu 2009). Moreover, the SEC has 
increased its emphasis on the importance of mutual fund boards by changing the requirements for 
board independence over the years (Roiter 2016). 
In this dissertation, we provide new evidence suggesting that the presence of mutual fund 
directors with high–quality monitoring experience is associated with statistically significant 
changes in fund attributes and that these changes have significant effects on economic outcomes. 
Specifically, we document that the presence of directors with intense monitoring experience on 
mutual fund boards is associated with higher turnover–performance sensitivity for the mutual fund 
manager, lower levels of hidden actions, and lower levels of risk–taking. This presence is also 
correlated with lower levels of flow–performance sensitivity in mutual funds.  
Drawing from the corporate governance literature, we define three measures to proxy for the 
quality of a corporate director’s monitoring experience. Specifically, we consider a director to be 
an intense monitor if she has served (1) on a corporate board during a forced CEO turnover, or (2) 
on an audit committee of a corporation board for at least three years or (3) on a corporate board 
with high–quality governance measured by the firm–level governance index constructed by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003, hereafter referred to as “GIM”). Each of these measures is 
selected according to previous literature which suggests that such experiences have meaningful 
effects on a director’s skill set. Ellis, Guo, and Mobbs (2016) document that a CEO turnover event 
is a significant learning experience for the directors involved and that they draw from this 
experience in their future board responsibilities. Moreover, directors serving on audit committees 
oversee financial reporting and internal control systems (Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash 2011), 
which are responsibilities similar to those of mutual fund directors. Finally, we argue that directors 
who serve on corporate boards with high–quality governance, as measured by the GIM index, are 
more likely to improve their skills when placed in a high–quality environment, because individuals 
learn from involvement in a high–quality group (Olivera and Straus 2004). 
With this sample, we analyze the consequences of hiring an intense monitor for the mutual 
fund’s board. The first question to study is which mutual funds are most likely to hire such 
directors. This question is particularly important because, upon establishment of a new fund, the 
investment management company is the mutual fund’s sole shareholder and selects the initial 
board (Mahoney 2004). In such a setting, the incentives for an investment management company 
to hire an intense monitor, whose fiduciary responsibility is to align mutual fund practices with 
shareholder interests, is not immediately clear. However, one can argue that the incentives of an 
investment management company for strengthening the internal governance are twofold. First, 
mutual fund scandals—such as the 2003 trading scandals (Zitzewitz 2006)—are promptly 
followed by substantial investor outflows from the management company’s funds (Houge and 
Wellman 2005), thereby resulting in a decrease in assets under management (AUM) and lower 
revenues. Thus, subsequent to a scandalous event, the investment company is more likely to hire 
an intense monitor to signal its commitment to improved governance in order to prevent further 
investor outflows. As Roiter (2016) argues: 
 Perhaps a fund has produced good investment results, but its adviser has run 
afoul of SEC rules, as occurred in the late trading abuses ten years ago. Fund 
shareholders might want to retain their holdings in the fund but prefer to have 
a fund board that will be more active, and more effective, in overseeing 
compliance by the fund and its adviser with governing laws and rules.” 
Second, as McCabe (2009) documents, even if the fraudulent funds involved in the 2003 
scandal were not exposed, investment management companies would have suffered net losses as 
a result of poor mutual fund performance. Consequently, an investment management company has 
incentives to prevent governance failures by strengthening the quality of its board of directors even 
in the absence of shareholders’ direct pressure. 
Using a Cox (1972) proportional hazard model, we find that being involved in a scandal is 
significantly associated with higher probability of hiring an intense monitor for a mutual fund. It 
is possible that, ex ante, a management company is not wary of the risks of an extreme governance 
failure; however, a substantial failure such as a scandal can be an eye–opening experience and 
causes the management company to interprets the risks of governance failure more cautiously and 
make an attempt to improve the governance. Moreover, the larger the size of the outflows 
experienced after a scandal, the higher the probability of an intense monitor to join the board. We 
also find that larger funds and family funds are more likely to hire an intense director, suggesting 
that such directors tend to seek board positions in more prestigious funds, which is consistent with 
the previous literature documenting that director reputation incentives influence the supply of 
director services (Masulis and Mobbs 2016). 
In order to study the consequences of hiring intense monitors, we analyze the managerial 
turnover–performance sensitivity of a mutual fund in presence of the intense monitors. A fund’s 
portfolio manager is an employee of the adviser company, not the investment company, and so the 
board cannot directly terminate the manager. However, since the board has the authority to 
renegotiate the adviser’s contract, it has extensive bargaining power against the adviser company 
to demand manager’s termination in case of dissatisfaction with her performance. In a brief to the 
Supreme Court in Jones v. Harris Associates, the Independent Directors Council (IDC) notes that 
[D]irectors can require the investment adviser to increase the quality of its 
services or take appropriate steps to improve its performance, such as by hiring 
a new portfolio manager for the fund; moving to a team approach of portfolio 
management; increasing the adviser’s investment research capability [...]1 
Consistently, we find that in the presence of an intense monitor on a fund’s board, the manager 
is more likely to be terminated after poor performance.   
There is still a possibility that by hiring the intense monitors, the investment company simply 
seeks to signal a governance improvement with no intention to effectually change the governance 
quality. However, we find that in the presence of an intense monitor, the probability of a 
managerial turnover is higher if poor performance is associated with window–dressing activity. 
                                                 
1 Jones v. Harris Associates, Supreme Court of the United States, Brief for the Independent Directors Council, No 
08-586.  
We interpret this result as an indication that the intense monitor will truly uplift the monitoring 
intensity. Nevertheless, we admit that we cannot completely reject this “signaling” possibility. 
In order to provide additional insight into these findings, we next study the behavior of the 
fund stakeholders in the presence of an intense monitor. We find that funds with an intense monitor 
on their board experience lower outflow–performance sensitivity, thereby suggesting that there 
exists a substitution relationship between the internal governance mechanisms (board of directors) 
versus external mechanisms (redemptions by investors). This substitution effect is consistent with 
previous literature, which has indicated that the degree of trust between the investors and funds 
plays an important role in the sensitivity of investor flows to performance (Gurun, Stoffman, and 
Yonker 2017; Kostovetsky 2015). In the context of this study, one can argue that with the presence 
of intense monitors on a fund’s board, fund investors consider the internal governance more 
trustworthy; thus, they are more likely to be patient with poor short–term performance and will 
hold on to their investments in periods of poor performance to see how the internal control process 
alleviates the situation. This lower level of outflow–performance sensitivity also suggests that 
management companies have incentives to hire intense directors in order to signal their 
commitment to improving the fund’s governance even in the absence of a public shareholder 
voting. Further analysis reveals that lower levels of outflow–performance sensitivity is driven by 
the institutional investors who are more sophisticated compared to retail investors (Evans and 
Fahlenbrach 2012), and so are more likely to be informed about the composition of the board.  
Further, we examine whether the presence of an intense monitor has any influence on the 
actions of the mutual fund manager. Our results show that the addition of an intense monitor to the 
fund’s board is linked to lower levels of negative gap returns (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 2008) 
and lower window–dressing activity (Agarwal, Gay, and Ling 2014), thereby suggesting that 
tenacious monitoring influences the hidden actions of the portfolio manager.  
In further analysis, we find that funds with intense monitors on their board hold on to their 
portfolio positions for longer periods of time. The portfolio holding horizon of mutual funds has 
been attributed to the fund manager’s skill (Lan, Moneta, and Wermers 2015); however, it can also 
be influenced by the degree of restriction imposed on the manager which affects how freely she 
trades or holds on to specific stocks in the portfolio. Such shift in behavior might be a result of the 
lower flow–performance sensitivity of the fund. Assume that a fund’s investors are extremely 
sensitive to poor performance and redeem their positions immediately after a weak quarter. In such 
a scenario, the manager is forced to liquidate parts of her portfolio in order to satisfy the cash 
needed for redeeming investors, even if she expects that the portfolio’s decline is temporary and 
is likely to reverse in the following quarters. This involuntary sale can cause even worse 
performance for the mutual fund, thereby creating a vicious cycle. Previous studies have shown 
that hedge funds that have preventive mechanisms that impede capital withdrawals—such as 
lockup, notice periods, and redemption periods—are associated with superior performance 
(Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik 2009). However, most mutual funds do not have such mechanisms in 
place; thus, they are prone to experience swift outflows subsequent to poor performance. 
Consequently, lower levels of outflow–performance sensitivity can result in a fund’s longer 
holding horizons. Moreover, if the board is tenaciously monitoring the manager’s performance, 
she might hold back from unnecessary trades that penalize shareholders by increasing the fees. 
One can expect that both of these effects result in an increase in the portfolio holding horizon of 
the fund.  
As Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2011) suggest, intense monitoring is not without potential 
costs. Firstly, intense monitors might overreact to a period of weak performance and prematurely 
fire a manager. Consistently, we find that the funds with intense monitors on their boards 
overemphasize recent performance and pay less attention to the longer–term performance of the 
fund upon deciding to terminate the fund manager. Moreover, we find that compared to the funds 
with no intense monitors, funds with intense monitors on their board experience less improvement 
in their performance subsequent to a managerial turnover.  
Moreover, intense monitors have reputational concerns so that they might opt to only serve 
on the board of larger, more prestigious funds. Consistently, we find that investment management 
companies with higher assets under management (AUM), as well as funds with higher AUM, are 
more likely to hire an intense monitor. 
The increased likelihood of managerial turnover in the presence of an intense monitor can 
reduce the managerial risk appetite. Consistently, we find that the presence of an intense monitor 
is associated with lower levels of excess return volatility of the fund.  
We make two key contributions to the existing literature. First, by tracking the career history 
of fund directors who have been previously on the board of corporations, we construct a unique 
dataset of highly experienced monitors who serve in the mutual fund industry. To this end, we 
construct a dataset of all mutual fund directors who are also serving in any given year, or have 
served in the previous three years, on a board of a corporation. This enables us to track the 
monitoring record of such directors on corporation boards and then ask whether they can bring this 
skill and experience to the mutual fund they are working for. Second, we use this dataset to 
document that in the presence of these directors, there are significant changes in how different 
mutual fund stakeholders—namely the fund’s board, manager, and investors—behave. 
Overall, the results of this study shed light on how the individual traits of the directors of 
mutual funds can influence different aspects of the funds. This study contributes to several strands 
of literature. Firstly, it adds to the literature on the effectiveness of the board of directors of mutual 
funds and its consequences on the characteristics of funds. There are a number of papers that 
discuss that the characteristics of the board of the mutual fund influence the fund’s performance 
(Adams, Nishikawa, and Rao 2018; Ding and Wermers 2012), adviser’s compensation (Adams, 
Mansi, and Nishikswa 2012; Calluzzo and Dong 2014; Kong and Tang 2008; Deli 2002; Tufano 
and Sevick 1997), managerial turnover (Kostovetsky and Warner 2015; Jin and Scherbina 2010; 
Fu and Wedge 2009), investment constraints (Almazan et al 2004), and merger decisions 
(Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge 2007) of a mutual fund. In contrast, a number of studies report very 
weak, if any, substantial effect of the board on the attributes of a mutual fund (Kuhnen 2009; Ferris 
and Yan 2007). The current study adds to this literature by providing more evidence of the 
significant role of boards of directors on different dimensions of a fund’s practice, arguing that 
neglecting individual characteristics of fund directors possibly contributed to the inconclusive 
results of existing studies. Further, by presenting evidence on how the presence of an intense 
monitor influences investor flows, we contribute to the growing literature that discusses the 
importance of trust in an investment management company for investors (Kostovetsky 2016; 
Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny 2015; Kumar, Niessen–Ruenzi, and Spalt 2015; Gurun, Stoffman, 
and Yonker 2017). Finally, by documenting the role of the previous experience on the intensity of 
their monitoring activity, this study contributes to the extensive existing literature that discusses 
the effects of individual traits on the firm governance outcomes. (Adams, Akyol, and Verwijmeren 
2018; Masulis and Zhang 2018; Dass et al. 2013; Calluzzo and Dong 2014; Masulis, Wang, and 
Xie 2012).  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized in the following manner. Section 2 discusses 
the institutional details of governance structure in the mutual fund industry. Section 3 summarizes 
the related literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the data collection procedure 
and provides the summary statistics. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes the 
dissertation.  
2. Institutional Background 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA) regulates the practice of the board of directors 
in the investment management industry. Under this Act, every open–end fund (i.e., mutual fund) 
in an investment management company has a separate legal entity and is required to have its 
distinct board of directors (equivalently called board of trustees). Unlike other types of 
corporations, funds generally have no employees of their own, and the board of directors—on 
behalf of the shareholders—delegates the management of the firm to the investment advisor and 
other affiliates, which are separate legal entities from the mutual fund itself. The SEC has been 
given discretionary authority in granting waivers and exemptions. 
Section 16 of the 1940 ICA requires that the board of directors be elected by shareholders. 
Prior to the public offering of the shares, the investment management company is considered the 
sole shareholder of the fund and elects the initial board of directors. The board of directors has 
fiduciary responsibilities in protecting investors against the potential nefarious behavior of fund 
managers. 
The structure of mutual funds is prone to potential conflicts of interests between the fund’s 
adviser and the fund’s shareholders. In particular, the manager’s compensation is structured as 
management fees and sales charges. Therefore, the SEC has emphasized the important role of 
board of directors in representing shareholder interests. In this setting, the board of directors is 
responsible for negotiating and reviewing the advisers’ fee every year and so representing the 
shareholders’ interests. The 1940 Act requires that at least 40% of the directors be independent of 
the management company, with no significant business relationship with the fund’s adviser. In 
2001, the SEC increased the requirement to a 50% majority; subsequently, in 2004, it required a 
supermajority of 75% independent directors on the board. 
Mutual fund directors have a broad set of responsibilities and duties. The 1940 ICA explicitly 
requires the decisions of the board of directors in (1) selecting the investment adviser and 
negotiating the fees and contract terms with the adviser, (2) engaging with an outside auditor, and 
(3) assigning “fair value” to securities that do not have quoted market prices2.  
The board of directors is also responsible for establishing general guidelines for fund 
practices, voting of proxies for the securities that the fund holds, and controlling and approving 
the process and announcement of fund disclosures. Different mutual funds may also define specific 
roles for the directors, which are reported publicly in the Statement of Additional Information 
filings (SAI). For example, one “PIMCO Funds” SAI filing states that its board of trustees can 
change the fund’s objective without prior notice to the shareholders, assess and manage risks 
associated with the fund activities, and control and approve the fund’s daily valuation process. It 
is also worth mentioning that unlike the fund’s shareholders who do not have personal access to 
the fund adviser, directors are able to meet with their investment adviser regularly (Phillips 2003).  
Most mutual funds are established and advised by an investment management company, 
which has to be registered as an “investment adviser” with the SEC. Generally, this management 
company can be the subsidiary of a bank, a broker–dealer, or a specialized financial service firm 
offering mutual fund management, such as Fidelity or Vanguard (Mahoney 2004). The latter is 
what is generally called a “Fund Family” in mutual fund literature. Upon initiating a new fund, the 
fund family establishes a management company, which includes one or more mutual funds (series) 
within the company. For example, in 2015, the Vanguard fund family had 285 investment 
companies with distinct ticker symbols, each of which contained several mutual fund series. Every 
mutual fund has a distinct board of directors; however, in practice, numerous boards comprise the 
                                                 
2 The SEC has effectually enabled fund boards to delegate the valuation responsibility to the fund adviser (Roiter 
2016). 
same members across all funds, which is called a “unitary board.” Figure (1) depicts a scheme of 
the organizational structure for Vanguard funds. 
In 2003, according to the Chief Compliance Officer Rule (CCO Rule), the SEC required that 
mutual funds appoint a chief compliance officer who has the overall responsibility for the fund’s 
compliance policies and procedures. The rule requires that the CCO directly report to the board of 
directors. Meetings of the board generally include a session with the CCO of the mutual fund as 
well, thereby strengthening the fiduciary role of the board of directors (Roiter 2016). 
Recently, more boards have been opting to have a specific nomination committee whose 
responsibility is to find and hire new directors for mutual funds. Most boards require that the 
committee exclusively comprise independent directors to minimize the potential conflict of 
interests between the management company and the shareholders. This committee is usually 
responsible for (1) identifying potential independent candidates, (2) evaluating the candidates in 
terms of their status and independence, and (3) nominating the independent directors for approval 
by the existing independent directors. Ferris and Yan (2007) report that 53% of fund families report 
that they have a nomination committee in the board of their mutual funds, but the number has been 
gradually rising. 
 
 
 Figure 1. A Scheme of the Organizational Structure of Vanguard Funds 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
There is extensive literature on the effects of individual traits of directors on the quality of 
governance in corporation boards; however, there are only a few studies on such characteristics in 
a mutual fund setting. For a public corporation, different attributes such as industry expertise 
(Wang, Xie, and Zhu 2015; Liu, Wei, Xie 2014), independence (Masulis and Zhang 2018), and 
prior experience (Field and Mkrtchyan 2017; Adams, Akyol, and Verwijmeren 2018) have been 
examined and documented in several studies. 
Based on these evidence, one can expect the monitoring experience of a mutual fund director 
to have substantial impact on the effectiveness of the boards of mutual funds. Based on previous 
literature, we use three different measures to proxy for a high–quality monitoring experience. First, 
a CEO turnover event is one of extreme monitoring practices during a corporate director’s tenure 
and has been widely considered as a measure of monitoring quality (Jenter and Kanaan, 2015). 
Thus, as the first measure, we define a high–quality monitor as a director who has been on the 
board of a corporation in the event of a forced managerial turnover. Ellis, Guo, and Mobbs (2016) 
have documented that directors who are involved in a CEO turnover event are likely to learn from 
this experience and employ these learned skills in their successive decisions. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to assume that a director also benefits from such an experience when she is appointed 
as a fund director. Second, since audit committees are known to involve considerable monitoring 
activity and effort (Klein 2002; Krishnan 2005), we take the presence of a director on an audit 
committee of a corporation for at least three years as another measure for intense monitoring 
experience. The audit committee oversees the financial reporting and internal control systems in a 
corporation (Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash 2011), responsibilities which are similar to the 
monitoring duties of a fund director. Ferris and Yan (2007) report that 98% of the funds have an 
audit committee within their board, and this committee has responsibilities similar to an audit 
committee of a corporation. With regard to the third measure, we take the experience of serving 
for a corporation in the lowest quintile of the GIM index (Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick 2003) as 
another proxy for intense monitoring experience. While the measures included in the GIM index 
are not particularly focused on individual attributes of the directors, being exposed to a higher 
quality governance environment can nevertheless shape the monitoring experience of the director. 
In fact, in psychology literature, it is argued that individuals can learn considerably if they are 
included in a highly active and effective group (Yager, Johnson, and Johnson 1985; Olivera and 
Straus 2004). Having defined our proxies for intense monitors, we turn to formalize our 
hypotheses.  
A fund that has experienced governance failures in the past is more likely to realize the 
necessity of hiring an intense monitor. It is possible that a management company is not wary of 
the governance failure risks ex ante; however, a substantial failure like a scandal can be an eye–
opening experience, changing the way the management company interprets the risks of governance 
failure. It is true that in certain fraudulent activities, such as the cases of timing and late trading 
scandals of 2003 (Zitzewitz 2006), the board was not necessarily informed about nor responsible 
for the ongoing fraudulent activities; however, the presence of a better board might have unearthed 
such activities, especially since the fund directors have more access to the fund managers and its 
internal processes (Phillips 2003). Consequently, it is likely that an investment company appoints 
new intense directors to signal improvement in the governance of the fund. Even if the portfolio 
manager is not at fault, as was the case with numerous funds involved in the scandals of 2003, the 
presence of a watchdog can prevent the investment company from entering such deals. 
Moreover, economic analysis of the 2003 scandals reveals that the management companies 
did not benefit from the fraudulent activity. As McCabe (2009) documents, even if the scandals 
were not exposed, the abysmal performance of the abused funds would cancel out the benefits of 
the fraudulent activity. Consequently, with that experience in mind, the investment company itself 
might also have the incentive to have more appropriate internal governance in place to avoid such 
mistakes in future.  
Furthermore, one can expect that outflows from a mutual fund are a sign of investors’ mistrust 
(Kostovetsky 2016); thus, funds experiencing outflows are more likely to seek hiring an intense 
monitor. Moreover, an intense monitor with a good reputation is probably going to accept to serve 
on boards of larger, more prestigious funds. Therefore, we formalize the first hypothesis in the 
following manner: 
H1–1: Mutual funds that have experienced governance failures are more likely to hire an intense 
monitor on their boards. 
H1–2: Larger family funds, larger mutual funds, and mutual funds experiencing negative flows 
are more likely to hire an intense monitor on their boards. 
Hiring an intense monitor can be consequential for the board of a mutual fund. Psychology 
studies have shown that individuals with adequate skills can uplift the performance of the entire 
group (Barsade 2002). An individual can improve the group’s performance through two channels: 
First, she can yield marginal effectiveness by participating in discussions and votings; second, she 
can change the culture of the group by motivating other directors to perform their responsibilities 
more tenaciously. Previous studies have shown that the culture of a corporation can lead to 
significant economic outcomes (Sapienza and Zingales 2006). Consistent with this view, the 
presence of specific individual directors on the board can uplift the overall quality of governance 
practices (Masulis and Zhang, 2018). Since the diverse characteristics of individual directors—
such as their industry expertise (Wang, Xie, and Zhu 2015; Dass et al 2013), gender (Liu, Wei, 
and Xie 2014), and cultural background (Dodd and Cimerova 2016; Armstrong, Core, and Guan 
2014)—have been shown to considerably influence firm practices, it is reasonable to expect that 
the presence of an intense monitor on the board of the mutual fund also has significant influence 
on the mutual fund and makes the board a more effective monitor of the mutual fund’s manager. 
It is true that the board of a mutual fund cannot directly terminate the fund manager since the 
manager is an employee of the adviser company; however, the board has sufficient bargaining 
power against the adviser company since it is directly the board’s decision to extend the adviser’s 
contract and set the managerial fees. In particular, the SEC has previously noted that the 
infrequency of an adviser's termination by the board does not necessarily indicate that the board 
of the mutual fund has not represented the shareholders’ interests, since they “can and frequently 
do employ means other than contract termination to effect changes.” Consequently, if the board is 
dissatisfied with the portfolio manager, it can exert sufficient pressure on the advisor to make some 
changes in the management team. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: The presence of an intense monitor on the board of a mutual fund increases the turnover–
performance sensitivity for the mutual fund's manager. 
The changes that an intense monitor brings to the internal governance can have spillover 
effects on other practices within the fund. The presence of an intense monitor can influence how 
sensitive the investors flows are to the performance of the mutual fund, thereby resulting in a lower 
flow–sensitivity for funds with intense monitors on their boards. Recently, the substituting 
relationship between internal and external governance mechanisms has been a topic of interest in 
the literature. Guo, Lach, and Mobbs (2015) document that after the 2002 mandatory regulatory 
changes in the internal governance of corporations listed on NYSE and NASDAQ, firms 
significantly reduced exposure to external governance mechanisms, thereby suggesting a 
substitution relationship between the internal and governance measures. Moreover, McCahery, 
Sautner, and Starks (2016) survey 143 institutional investors and document that investors use 
internal pressure and exit threat complementarily in order to affect the governance practices of 
corporations. Consequently, we expect that with higher quality internal governance, the investors 
opt to lower levels of outflow subsequent to a poor performance period. Moreover, a recent strand 
of literature documents the effects of trust in the mutual fund industry. Attributes such as the brand 
of the management company (Kostovetsky 2016) or reputation of the manager (Kumar, Niessen–
Ruenzi, and Spalt 2015) have all been shown to significantly affect the flow of investors into and 
out of mutual funds. Consistent with this view, improved governance quality can result in higher 
investors trust in the fund management, and so one might expect to observe changes in the flow 
performance sensitivity of the mutual fund. Therefore, we formulate the second hypothesis in the 
following manner:  
H3: The presence of an intense monitor on the board of a mutual fund is associated with lower 
levels of flow–sensitivity. 
Finally, the presence of an intense monitor can be influential on the behavior of the mutual 
fund manager. The return gap, which is the difference between the return reported by the mutual 
fund and the holding return of disclosed positions, has been attributed to the hidden actions 
performed by the fund managers (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 2008). Since mutual fund 
directors have extensive personal access to mutual fund managers (Phillips 2013), we expect that 
a more intensive monitoring board be associated with lower levels of return gaps. Further, if 
changes in internal governance leads to lower outflow sensitivity, the fund manager will not be 
frequently forced to liquidate her positions, thereby potentially increasing the duration for which 
a fund holds on to its positions. Based on these arguments, we propose the following two 
hypotheses:  
H4: The presence of an intense monitor on the board of a mutual fund is associated with 
significantly lower levels of negative return gaps and lower levels of window–dressing behavior. 
H5: The presence of an intense monitor on the board of a mutual fund increases the average 
holding horizon of its investments. 
4. Data 
4.1. Data on individual directors 
We begin by collecting a measure of monitoring experience for mutual fund directors. To this 
end, we collect the names and characteristics of all corporate directors from a dataset of directors 
from the Compact Disclosure database (as described in Dass et al. 2014), and Boardex, to construct 
a comprehensive sample of all corporate directors. In the next step, we track the appointment of 
these corporate directors on the boards of mutual funds. While hand–collecting the name of all 
directors of these funds is too arduous, we write a python program to search the name of each 
corporate director in the N–CSR filings of mutual funds. N–CSR filings are semiannual disclosures 
filed by the investment management company and, among other information, they contain the 
name and information of the board of directors (or trustees) of every fund that the investment 
company includes. In order to keep the number of queries manageable for each year and for each 
mutual fund, we search the names of all corporate directors who had served in the past three years. 
We searched for the names of over 450,000 director–years within over 98,000 N–CSR filings, 
from 2003 to 2015. Further, we use the advanced computing tools described by Sarajilic et al. 
(2017) to cope with the massive computing power required for the high volume of search queries. 
Within the N–CSR filings, if the name of a corporate director is recognized as a director, that 
individual is recorded as a fund director with experience in corporate boards. B between years 
2003 and 2015, on average, 1266 unique investment companies posted filings on the SEC EDGAR 
system every year.  
We take several steps to confirm the integrity of the data. We carefully match the names based 
on first name, middle name, family name, and prefixes (such as Dr, Professor, General, etc.) and 
suffixes (Jr, Sr, etc.) wherever possible. We scan the final sample to ensure that the matched names 
are the same individual. 
As mentioned earlier, the observations in the N–CSR filings are at the level of the investment 
management company, which can include one or more mutual funds within the company. In order 
to establish a link between the management company and the involved mutual funds, we write 
another program to search through the N–SAR filings of management companies in which the 
number and names of their corresponding mutual funds is mentioned under items 7A, 7B, and 7C. 
With the latter step, we are able to record observations at the director–mutual fund level. The last 
step is to match the names of mutual funds collected from N–SAR filings with the CRSP database. 
4.2. Intense monitoring measures 
As discussed in the previous section, we use three different measures as proxies for monitoring 
experience or monitoring intensity. First, we assign a director an intense monitor if she has been 
involved in a forced turnover of a CEO in the corporations in which she served prior to joining the 
mutual fund. To this end, we use the dataset of forced turnover CEOs described in Jenter and 
Kanaan (2015) and Peters and Wagner (2014). Then, we assign any director who has served on an 
audit committee for at least three years as an intense monitor. We collect the details of serving on 
audit committees from the Boardex database. Finally, we use the governance index defined in 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and assign any director who has served on a firm with the GIM 
index in the lower quintile. 
4.3. Mutual fund data 
We use the data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) equity mutual fund data 
from 2003 to 2016 for all domestic equity mutual funds (Codes “D” and “E”). In addition, we use 
the MFLINKS table from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) to merge the mutual fund 
holding data with the Thomson Reuters S12 database. We collect fund characteristics such as 
expense ratio, load fee, etc. from CRSP. 
4.4. Construction of variables 
[1] Measures of a fund’s flow and performance 
For each fund, we estimate the net quarterly flows as a percentage of its total assets under 
management by using its quarterly return and its assets under management (AUM) in the following 
manner: 
                         𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤௝,௧ =  
஺௎ெೕ,೟ି஺௎ெೕ,೟షభ൫ଵାோ௘௧ೕ,೟൯
஺௎ெೕ,೟షభ
                                   (1) 
where t represents the quarter and j denotes the fund. In order to measure the fund’s performance, 
we estimate the factor loadings from the three–factor model in Fama and French (1993) and the 
four–factor model as in Carhart (1997). We use the monthly net returns of each mutual fund over 
24–month rolling windows. Alphas for each quarter are calculated out of sample by using the 
factor loadings calculated from the prior 24–month data. 
[2] Measures of return gap and window dressing 
Following the literature (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 2008), we define the return gap as the 
difference between the net investor return and the net holding return, calculated as 
                                          𝑅𝐺௧ = 𝑅𝐹௧ − (𝑅𝐻௧ − 𝐸𝑋𝑃௧)                                                      (2) 
where RF denotes the investors’ total return, RH denotes the return of the fund’s holding as the 
total return of a hypothetical buy–and–hold portfolio—from the portfolio disclosed at t–1, and 
EXP denotes the expense ratio of the mutual fund. 
With regard to the window–dressing measure, we use the measure defined in Agarwal, Gay, and 
Ling (2014) that accounts for the difference between the quarterly return of a hypothetical portfolio 
disclosed at the end of the quarter and the fund’s actual quarterly return: 
          BHRG = Backward Holding Return–Actual Return (AR)                                (3) 
[3] Measures of a fund’s holding horizon 
Following Lan, Moneta, and Wermers (2015), we define four distinct measures for the fund 
investment horizon. The first measure, the Simple Horizon Measure (SHM), counts the holding 
horizon of a stock as the time span with nonzero holdings. Thus, the holding horizon of stock i 
held by fund j at time t is calculated as 
                                                 ℎଵ௜,௝,௧ = 𝑠 − 𝑘 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑠,                                               (4) 
where k denotes the time at which the stock is purchased, and s is the time at which the stock is 
sold. Essentially, this measure only accounts for the buying and selling of the full position in every 
stock and does not consider the changes in the number of positions in every stock. Consequently, 
this measure is constant for a given stock as long as the stock is held by the mutual fund. 
The second measure is the FIFO Horizon Measure (FIFO), which is constructed assuming that 
the first purchased shares are sold first. Therefore, the holding horizon of stock i held by fund j at 
time t is calculated as 
                             ℎ௜,௝,௧ଶ =  ൝
∑ ே೔,ೕ,ೖ,ೞ ×(௦ି௞)ೖ,ೞ
ே೔,ೕ,೟
  𝑖𝑓 𝑁௜,௝,௧ > 0
0                             𝑖𝑓 𝑁௜,௝,௧ = 0
                                                     (5) 
in which 𝑁௜,௝,௞,௦ denotes the number of shares of stock i that fund j purchased at time k and sold at 
time s, and 𝑁௜,௝,௧ denotes the number of shares of stock i held by fund j at time t. Unlike the SHM 
measure, the FIFO measure allows for variation in the holding period of each stock through time. 
The third investment horizon measure is the ex–ante simple measure (EAS), which uses only 
the information available at time t in calculating the holding period at time t—hence, an ex–post 
measure. Specifically, for stock i held by fund j at time t, the EAS holding horizon measure is 
calculated as 
                                ℎ௜,௝,௧ଷ =  ൜
𝑡 − 𝑘    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 ≤ 𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 >  ∆௝
0                               𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                 (6) 
where ∆௝  denotes two years after the initiation of fund j and k denotes the time when the stock is 
purchased.  
The fourth measure of investment horizon, Duration Measure (DM), is constructed as 
                                    ℎ௜,௝,௧ସ =  ∑
(௧ି௦)×ఈ೔,ೕ,ೞ
ு೔,ೕା஻೔,ೕ
+  ௐ ×ு೔,ೕ
ு೔,ೕା஻೔,ೕ
௧
௦ୀ௧ିௐାଵ                                             (7) 
where 𝐵௜,௝ is the percentage of total shares of stock i bought between time t–W and time t, and 𝐻௜,௝ 
is the percentage of total shares outstanding of stock i held at time t–W, and 𝛼௜,௝,௦ is the percentage 
of total shares outstanding of stock i brought or sold by fund j during period s. 
The aforementioned measures of investment horizon are at stock–level. In order to aggregate 
these measures at the fund level, we take the value–weighted average of each stock in the portfolio. 
4.5 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables discussed above. In panel (A) we have 
reported the summary statistics of the final sample, and panel (B) reports the changes in the intense 
monitor proxy variables over the sample period. It is evident that 11% of the mutual funds in the 
sample have an intense monitor on their boards. Further, 8% of the mutual funds include an intense 
monitor with audit experience of at least 3 years; 5% include an intense monitor who worked for 
a corporate board with GIM below quintile, and 3% include intense monitors with a forced 
turnover experience while serving on a corporate board.  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics  
This table reports the summary statistics of the data using fund–quarter observations between January 
2003 and December 2015. IntenseMonitor is an indicator that is equal to one if the fund has an intense 
monitor on board, and zero otherwise. AuditExperience, GIMlowest, and TurnoverExperience are 
indicator variables for the presence of a monitor with corresponding experience on board. Flow is the 
quarterly flow in percentage of the total assets. Index is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is 
an index fund, and zero otherwise. Institutional is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
fund is available only to institutional investors. Alpha3 and Alpha4 are the alpha performances based on 
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), respectively. AllIndep is equal to one if all directors are 
independent, and zero otherwise. BoardSize is the log of number of directors on board. ReturnGap is the 
difference between the announced return of the mutual fund and the return from holding the positions 
mutual fund disclosed at the beginning of the quarter. BHRG is the absolute measure of window dressing 
defined as the difference between the backward holding return and the actual return (Agarwal, Gay, and 
Ling 2014). SHH, FIFO, EAS, and DM are mutual fund holding horizon measures that represent Simple 
horizon measure, FIFO horizon measure, Ex-ante simple horizon measure, and Duration measure of the 
mutual fund, calculated on the basis of Lan, Moneta, and Wermers (2015). 
  
Variable  N Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
IntenseMonitor 59,736 0.11 0.23 0 0 0 
    AuditExperience 59,736 0.08 0.11 0 0 0 
    GIMlowest 59,736 0.05 0.13 0 0 0 
    TurnoverExperience 59,736 0.03 0.07 0 0 0 
Flow 59,736 3.18 18.92 -5.10 1.59 10.12 
Fund Size (log) 59,736 7.01 2.18 1.99 7.18 8.35 
Family Size (log) 59,736 9.41 3.25 2.12 9.94 11.18 
Index 59,736 0.03 0.14 0 0 0 
Institutional 59,736 0.24 0.35 0 0 0 
Expense ratio 59,736 1.32 0.24 1.04 1.34 1.78 
Turnover ratio 59,736 0.97 1.02 0.33 0.67 1.11 
AllIndep 59,736 0.21 0.35 0 0 0 
BoardSize 59,736 8.64 3.74 1 6 9 
Return 59,736 0.49 2.87 -0.01 0.02 0.91 
Alpha3 59,736 -0.21 4.03 -2.08 -0.14 1.64 
Alpha4 59,736 -0.19 4.09 -2.03 -0.12 1.86 
ReturnGap 59,736 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.02 
BHRG (in %) 59,736 0.64 0.13 -3.63 0.16 0.94 
SHH 59,736 4.07 2.17 1.45 3.78 5.15 
FIFO 59,736 2.55 1.69 0.76 2.23 3.19 
EAS 59,736 2.23 1.04 0.36 1.78 2.97 
DM 59,736 1.19 0.52 0.19 1.11 1.34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel (B): Intense Monitor Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 AuditExperience 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 GIMLowest 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
TurnoverExperience 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Intense Monitor 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Determinants of hiring an intense monitor 
In this section, we examine which factors are effectual in a mutual fund’s decision to hire an 
intense monitor. To this end, we use Cox’s (1972) proportional hazard model to measure the 
likelihood of hiring an intense monitor on the board, conditional on not having hired her in the 
previous period. Hence, we define the Cox equation as 
                                              ℎ௧൫𝑥௜,௧൯ = ℎ଴(𝑡) exp (𝛽𝑥௜,௫ᇱ )                                               (8) 
where 𝑥௜,௧ is a vector of mutual fund characteristics, 𝛽 is a vector of coefficients, and ℎ଴(𝑡) is the 
baseline hazard function.  
Table 2 reports the results of the Cox model estimation. In model (1), we observe that the 
coefficient on the variable Scandal is positive and significant, thereby suggesting that for funds 
that have been involved in scandalous events, there is a higher likelihood of subsequently hiring 
an intense monitor. This result indicates that, subsequent to a scandal, fund management 
companies realize the importance of improving governance practices or at least the signaling of 
such behavior to investors. We also observe that the coefficient on the variable FundFlow is 
significant and negative, thereby suggesting that mutual funds experiencing outflows are more 
likely to hire intense monitors, possibly to strengthen their governance and signal to their 
unsatisfied investors. In order to investigate the simultaneous effect of FundFlow and Scandal, we 
also include the interaction term between these variables. We observe that the coefficient of 
interaction between FundFlow and Scandal is significant and negative. This result suggests that, 
among the funds that were involved in scandalous events, the ones that experienced the highest 
outflows are associated with a greater propensity of hiring an intense monitor for their boards. 
Thus, if the scandalous event damage a fund to a greater extent, the management company is more 
responsive. Among the control variables included, the coefficients on fund’s and family’s size are 
both positive and significant, thereby suggesting that larger funds are more likely to hire an intense 
monitor. This can indicate that intense monitors are more likely to join the boards of larger, more 
prestigious funds. 
In models (2) and (3), we include more proxies for the strength of mutual fund governance. 
Consistent with the existing literature (Yermack 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells 1998; 
Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge 2007), we use size of the board and board independence to control 
different aspects of a fund’s board governance. Specifically, in model (2), we include BoardSize 
and its interaction with Scandal. The coefficients on these variables are not significantly different 
from zero, thereby indicating that this governance measure would not predict the probability of 
hiring a more intense director to the board. In model (3), we use the indicator variable Allindep, 
which is one if the board consists wholly of independent directors, and zero otherwise. The 
coefficient of the interaction term between Allindep and Scandal is positive and significant at the 
10% confidence level. Ferris and Yan (2007) document that independent mutual fund boards did 
not associate with the probability of being involved in the late trading scandal. The results of model 
(3) indicate that independent boards have been partially effective in the aftermath of scandals by 
increasing the likelihood of hiring an intense monitor on the board. The coefficient on Institutional 
is also significantly positive, thereby indicating that funds with a higher proportion of institutional 
clientele are more likely to hire an intense monitor on their boards. Since Evans and Fahlenbrach 
(2012) have documented that institutional investors are more sophisticated and that their flows are 
more sensitive to performance, our results suggest that funds with more flow originating from 
institutional investors are more likely to improve the governance of their funds.  
 
Table 2: Determinants of Hiring an Experienced Monitor 
This table reports the estimates from the Cox proportional hazard model. We estimate the likelihood of 
hiring an experienced monitor as a board director at t+1, given that she was not hired at time t. Scandal 
takes the value of 1 if the mutual fund was involved in the fund trading scandal of 2003 and 0 otherwise. 
Fundflow is the annual fund flow for the mutual fund in the preceding year to the hiring event. The sign 
* denotes an interaction between the two variables. BoardSize is the log of the number of people on board. 
Allindep is a dummy variable equal to one if all of the board directors are independent, and zero otherwise. 
FundSize and FamilySize are the log of fund TNA and family TNA, respectively. Z-scores are given in 
the parentheses. Institutional is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the fund is available only 
to institutional investors. The standard errors are clustered at family level. The observations are at fund-
year level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Scandal 0.038* 0.027** 0.039* 0.017* 
 (1.84) (2.09) (1.71) (1.93) 
FundFlow -0.037** -0.034** -0.029** -0.034** 
 (-2.13) (-2.05) (-2.51) (-2.16) 
FundFlow*Scandal -0.309** -0.308** -0.237** -0.157* 
 (-2.00) (-1.99) (-2.18) (-1.95) 
BoardSize  0.003  0.002 
  (0.74)  (0.31) 
BoardSize*Scandal  0.006  0.009 
  (0.99)  (1.24) 
AllIndep   0.069 0.035 
   (1.12) (-0.99) 
AllIndep*Scandal   0.033* 0.047 
   (1.77) (1.64) 
ManagerTenure 0.012 0.014 0.032 0.049 
 (0.37) (0.89) (0.57) (0.67) 
FundAge 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 
 (0.47) (0.21) (0.12) (0.18) 
FundSize 0.045* 0.036** 0.041** 0.032** 
 (1.88) (2.09) (2.09) (2.01) 
FamilySize  0.023***  0.025** 
  (3.11)  (1.98) 
Institutional 0.005** 0.003** 0.004** 0.002** 
 (1.96) (2.42) (1.97) (1.76) 
TurnRatio 0.113* 0.203* 0.132* 0.234 
 (1.72) (1.79) (1.80) (1.19) 
ExpRatio 0.086** 0.105* 0.107** 0.123* 
 (2.11) (1.88) (1.99) (1.72) 
LoadFee 0.031 0.061 0.075 0.063 
 (0.82) (0.67) (0.42) (0.69) 
Time FE 
Family FE 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Number of Observations 18,844 18,844 18,844 18,844 
Since the data collected on hiring monitors are at the annual level, the regressions for Table 2 
are estimated at the annual level. 
5.2 Turnover–performance sensitivity for mutual fund managers  
The results of Table 2 suggest that mutual funds are likely to seek hiring intense monitors if 
they have experienced failures in the past. Here, we continue the investigation by asking whether 
the addition of an intense monitor on the board of a mutual fund has any consequences on the 
fund’s attributes. For this purpose, we test hypothesis (2) by estimating the sensitivity of a 
manager’s turnover to her performance in funds that hire intense monitors and comparing it to the 
funds that do not hire such monitors. An intense monitor may improve the internal governance of 
the fund by conducting a tenacious monitoring of the manager’s performance; therefore, it is likely 
that we see an increased sensitivity in the performance–turnover relationship. To this end, we 
estimate the following equation: 
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑑௜,௧ାଵ =  
                    𝛽ଵ𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟௜,௧ +  𝛽ଶ𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒௜,௧ + 𝛽_ଷ𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟௜,௧ × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒௜,௧ +
                            ∑ 𝛾௝,𝜃௜,௧,௝௝ +  𝜑௜ +  𝜔௧ +  𝜀௜,௧ାଵ                                               (9) 
where forcedi,t+1 is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a forced turnover in the mutual fund 
i at time t+1, and zero otherwise; Monitor is the indicator of having an intense monitor on board; 
𝜃௜,௧,௝ denotes the control variable j for fund i at time t and the 𝛾௝ denotes the estimated coefficient 
for that control variable; Performance is a measure of the fund performance in the previous 
quarter; and φ୧ and ω୲ are fund and year dummies, respectively. 
While we can observe whenever a manager leaves the mutual fund, it is not immediately 
obvious whether the departure was voluntary or forced by the board. In order to construct a proxy 
for a forced turnover event, we rank the performance of the mutual funds one year prior to the 
turnover event, and then assign the turnovers in the lower–than–median group as a forced turnover. 
Abysmal performance results in fund outflows; these outflows have a negative economic impact 
on the management company, as a result of which it is likely that the company terminates the 
manager. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that the turnover of managers with superior 
performance (above median performances) is voluntary and is possibly on account of a move to 
larger mutual funds or even to a hedge fund (Kostovetsky, 2009). 
The regression results are reported in Table 3. In the first model, the dependent variable is 
AllTurnover, which is equal to one if the manager has left the mutual fund, and zero otherwise. In 
model (2), we regress the defined forced manager turnover on a three–factor alpha performance 
measure to confirm the validity of a forced turnover measure, and we observe that the coefficient 
on performance is negative and highly significant. Thus, the assumption that the selected turnovers 
are indeed a result of poor performance is confirmed. In models (2) to (6), we use different models 
to test the performance sensitivity hypothesis. There are several findings consistent with the 
original hypothesis. 
First, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term between the variables Monitor and 
Performance is negative and highly significant. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that the 
presence of an intense monitor on the board has no effects on turnover performance sensitivity. 
Second, the coefficient on the Monitor variable itself is positive and significant, thereby suggesting 
that the intense monitor increases the turnover probability. We also include FlowAlpha, which is 
the fund’s last year residual flow, adjusted for the fact that flow follows the performance. 
Consistent with the literature, the coefficient on FlowAlpha is not significant, thereby implying 
that the funds can bring out the trading skills of the manager from her marketing skills.  
Table 3: Managerial Turnover–performance Sensitivity and Intense Monitors on the Boards of 
Mutual Funds 
  
This table reports the estimates from a probit regression model to estimate the effect of having an intense 
monitor on the board of a mutual fund on the managerial turnover sensitivity. The dependent variable in 
model (1) is AllTurnover, which is equal to one if a fund has undergone managerial turnover during the 
corresponding year, and zero otherwise. In models (2)-(6), the dependent variable is ForcedTurnover, which 
is equal to one if the fund’s risk–adjusted performance has been below median in the year prior to the 
manager’s turnover. FlowAlpha is the abnormal 12-month flow after adjusting the flow for the fact that flow 
chases past returns (Kostovetsky and Warner 2015). Columns (1) - (3) report the results using three-factor 
alphas, and columns (4) - (6) present the results using the four-factor, five-factor and DGTW alphas, 
respectively. ManagerTenure is the manager’s tenure in the mutual fund. Allindep is an indicator that is 
equal to one if all of the board members of the fund are independent, and zero otherwise. BoardSize is the 
log of number of board members on the mutual fund. All standard errors are clustered at the fund level. The 
observations are at the fund-quarter level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable 
All 
Turnover 
Forced 
Turnover 
Forced 
Turnover 
Forced 
Turnover 
Forced 
Turnover 
Forced 
Turnover 
Monitor 0.097*  0.013** 0.019** 0.014** 0.011** 
 (1.67) 
 (2.21) (2.45) (2.32) (2.26) 
Monitor*Performance -0.065*  -0.104** -0.126*** -0.129** -0.153** 
 (-1.92) 
 (-2.53) (-3.14) (-2.39) (-2.27) 
Performance -0.081** -0.153*** -0.092*** -0.087*** -0.083*** -0.067*** 
 (-2.03) (-7.12) (-6.13) (-4.23) (-3.94) (-2.75) 
FlowAlpha -0.042 -0.051* -0.037 -0.029 -0.035 -0.041 
 (-1.31) (-1.94) (-1.39) (-1.63) (-1.50) (-1.19) 
FundSize -0.032** -0.013** -0.011** -0.007** -0.007** -0.006** 
 (-2.53) (-2.15) (-2.47) (-2.54) (-2.01) (-2.44) 
ManagerAge -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.52) (-1.05) (-0.85) (-0.74) (-0.63) (-0.90) 
ManagerTenure -0.045** -0.016* -0.022* -0.031* -0.027* -0.037* 
 (-2.16) (-1.74) (-1.69) (-1.83) (-1.87) (-1.37) 
Allindep 0.041*** 0.088** 0.067* 0.052* 0.051* 0.083* 
 (2.67) (2.09) (1.75) (1.88) (1.72) (1.70) 
BoardSize -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
  (-1.36) (-1.04) (0.95) (-0.69) (0.41) (0.43) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Family FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of 
Observations 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.056 0.053 0.061 0.060 0.061 0.064 
 
Table 4: Matched Sample Analysis of Managerial Turnover-performance Sensitivity 
This table reports the results of having an intense monitor on the board on the managerial turnover likelihood 
using entropy balanced sample matching (Hainmueller 2012). Panel (A) reports the characteristics for the 
treatment and control sample. Panel (B) reports the results of the panel regression. The regressions use 
quarter-level observations. The dependent variable in model (1) is AllTurnaround, which is equal to one if 
the manager’s tenure is terminated, and zero otherwise. In models (2) and (3) the dependent variable is 
Forced Turnover, which is equal to one if the manager has been terminated involuntarily, and zero otherwise. 
Columns (1) and (2) use three-factor alpha as the performance measure, and model (3) reports the results 
with four-factor alpha as performance measure. The standard errors are clustered at the family level. The 
controls are the control variables used in Table 3 (not reported here for brevity). 
Panel (A) 
    Treatment Control 
FundSize 9.41 9.40 
FundFlow 0.03 0.03 
ExpRatio(%) 0.012 0.012 
TurnRatio 0.73 0.71 
FamilySize 10.81 10.83 
Panel (B) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent variable AllTurnover ForcedTurnover ForcedTurnover 
Monitor 0.008* 0.016** 0.013** 
  (1.80) (2.23) (1.99) 
Monitor * performance -0.072* -0.094** -0.091** 
  (-1.91) (-2.11) (-2.56) 
performance -0.055* -0.084** -0.072** 
  (-1.71) (-2.19) (-2.72) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES 
Family FE YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 19,668 19,668 19,668 
 
 
 
Finally, among the other control variables, the coefficients on ManagerTenure and Allindep 
are significantly negative and positive. These results suggest that a longer tenure of the manager 
is associated with lower probability of forced turnover, while an all–independent board increases 
such a likelihood. These results are also consistent with previous literature (Chevalier and Ellison 
1999). 
The results of Table 3 suggest that the presence of an intense monitor on the board increases 
the managerial turnover performance sensitivity of a mutual fund. In order to confirm the 
robustness of the results reported in Table 3, we also employ a matching methodology to test the 
sensitivity of turnover to performance. Following recent literature (Agarwal, Vashishtha, and 
Venkatachalam 2018), we use the entropy balancing technique to match the sample with a control 
group. According to existing literature (Hainmueller 2012; Hainmueller and Xu 2013), entropy 
balancing leads to better matching results by placing a continuous set of weights on the matched 
group.  
The results of this matching are reported in Table 4. Panel (A) reports the different 
characteristics of the mutual funds for both the treatment and matched samples. We matched on 
the size of the fund and the family, turnover ratio, expense ratio, and the previous fund flow, as 
well as the style of the funds. We observe that these characteristics are statistically very similar to 
each other, thereby suggesting that the matching technique has been successful. Panel (B) reports 
the estimated results of equation (9) using the matching approach. Our results in Table 3 are 
confirmed here. Model (1) reports the estimated results of the regression with all turnover events 
as the dependent variable. In models (2) and (3), the dependent variable is the forced turnover, as 
defined earlier. We observe that the coefficient on the interaction between Monitor and 
Performance is significantly negative, again confirming that the presence of an intense monitor on 
the board increases the turnover–performance sensitivity.  
In Table 5, we further investigate the effect of an intense monitor on the turnover probability 
of the manager by using different time horizons for performance measures. Specifically, in 
addition to the 12–month period performance in model (1), we use the performances for 24 months, 
36 months, 48 months, and 60 months, in models (2) to (5), respectively. We also interact the 
WindowDressing variable with Monitor and Performance variables to capture the effect of hidden 
activities in the probability of managerial turnover. Several interesting results are evident from 
Table 5. First, the triple interaction between WindowDressing, Monitor, and Performance is 
significant and negative in the first two models. This implies that, based on short–term 
performances, if the poor performance of the fund is coupled with hidden actions of the manager, 
the board is more likely to act and fire the manager, thereby suggesting the dissatisfaction of the 
board with the manager’s hidden practices. Moreover, it is evident that the significance of the 
results disappears when longer horizon terms of performance are applied. This might be suggestive 
of an overreaction in intense monitoring: intense monitors might focus too much on the short–term 
horizon rather than evaluating the longer–term horizon of the manager’s performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Turnover-performance Sensitivity for Managers and Intense Monitors on Board: Different 
Performance Horizons 
This table reports the estimates from a probit regression to measure the effect of having an intense monitor on 
the board of a mutual fund on the managerial turnover sensitivity, based on different time horizons. The 
dependent variable is ForcedTurnover, which is equal to one if the fund’s risk–adjusted performance has been 
below median in the year prior to the manager’s turnover, and zero otherwise.12Month, 24Month, 36Month 
and 60Month performances are the yearly average of DGTW adjusted returns corresponding to the horizon. 
FlowAlpha is the abnormal 12-month flow after adjusting the flow for the fact that flow chases past returns. 
Monitor is an indicator that is equal to one if there is an intense monitor on board, and zero otherwise. 
ManagerTenure is the manager’s tenure in the mutual fund. Allindep is an indicator that is equal to one if all 
the board members of the fund are independent, and zero otherwise. BoardSize is the log of the number of 
board members on the mutual fund. All standard errors are clustered at the fund level. The observations are 
at the fund-quarter level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Forced Turnover 
Forced 
Turnover 
Forced 
Turnover 
Forced 
Turnover 
Forced 
Turnover       
12MonthPerformance -0.076***     
 (-3.04) 
    
24MonthPerformance  -0.068***    
 
 (-2.72)    
36MonthPerformance   -0.044*   
 
  (-1.82)   
48MonthPerformance    -0.048*  
 
   (-1.87)  
60MonthPerformance     -0.031* 
     (-1.91) 
Monitor*Performance*WindowDressing -0.039** -0.041* -0.014 -0.023 -0.018 
 (-2.17) (-1.81) (-0.75) (-1.09) (-0.66) 
Monitor*WindowDressing 0.001* 0.006* 0.007 0.004 0.004 
 (1.65) (1.77) (1.38) (0.75) (1.14) 
Performance*WindowDressing 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 (0.51) (0.65) (0.54) (0.16) (1.18) 
Monitor*Performance -0.049* -0.032* -0.078 -0.085 -0.083 
 (-1.72) (-1.80) (-0.71) (-0.97) (-0.66) 
Monitor 0.037** 0.029* 0.012* 0.034* 0.023* 
 (2.18) (1.90) (1.65) (1.74) (1.89) 
WindowDressing 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 (1.03) (0.61) (0.54) (0.77) (0.93) 
FlowAlpha -0.039 -0.045* -0.073* -0.065* -0.085 
 (-1.46) (-1.87) (-1.68) (-1.93) (-1.53) 
FundSize 0.068** 0.047** 0.053** 0.040** 0.043** 
 (2.24) (2.04) (2.47) (1.98) (2.28) 
ManagerAge -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.55) (-1.59) (-0.30) (-0.78) (-0.66) 
ManagerTenure -0.026* -0.034* -0.037* -0.026* -0.013* 
 (-1.84) (-1.72) (-1.66) (-1.65) (-1.75) 
Allindep 0.028** 0.012* 0.016* 0.029* 0.024* 
 (2.33) (1.79) (1.87) (1.68) (1.70) 
BoardSize -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.39) (-0.21) (-0.72) (-0.78) (-0.45) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Family FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 59,736 47,206 34,805 27,121 23,912 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.070 0.070 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3. Flow–performance sensitivity and intense monitors on the board 
In previous sections, we documented that the presence of an intense monitor on the board of 
a mutual fund improves the fund’s internal governance. Now, we consider the possibility that such 
changes within the fund have spillover effects that influence the decisions made by external 
investors of the mutual fund. Specifically, in Section 2, we hypothesized that if the fund investors 
observe an improvement in the internal governance practice of a mutual fund, they will use their 
external governance measure—that is, the option to redeem less severely. In this section, we 
formally test this hypothesis by analyzing the sensitivity of a mutual fund’s flow to its performance 
in funds that hire intense monitors versus those without intense monitors on their boards. To this 
end, we estimate the following equation: 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤௜,௧ାଵ =        
                      𝛽ଵ𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟௜,௧ +  𝛽ଶ𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒௜,௧ +  𝛽ଷ𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +
                                      ∑ 𝛾௝𝜃௜,௝,௧ +  𝜗௜ + 𝜔௧ + 𝜀௜,௧ାଵ௝                                                        (10) 
where 𝜗௜  is the fund family fixed effects. Other variables are defined as before. The main 
coefficient of interest here is 𝛽ଷ , which represents the sensitivity of the fund flows to the 
performance of the mutual fund. 
The results of estimating equation (10) are presented in Table 6. In panel (A), we report the 
estimation on the entire sample. Interestingly, we observe that the coefficient of the interaction 
between Monitor and Performance is negative and highly significant, thereby indicating that in 
the presence of an intense monitor on the board, investors exhibit lower sensitivity to the 
performance of the mutual funds. This suggests that investors view the internal governance of the 
mutual fund as a substitute of external governance; thus, the strength of one brings about milder 
strength of the other. This can be interpreted as confidence of the investors in the mutual fund’s 
governance (Kostovetsky 2016; Gurun, Stoffman, and Yonker 2018). The coefficient on the 
Monitor variable is also significantly negative, which again confirms the interpretation of trust in 
the intense monitor of the mutual fund. In models (1) – (4), we use raw return, CAPM alpha, three–
factor alpha as in Fama and French (1993), and the four–factor alpha as in Carhart (1997) as 
performance measures, respectively. The performance variable has a significantly positive 
coefficient, which is consistent with our expectation: the better the performance of the fund, the 
higher (the more positive) the flow of the fund. In order to capture the entire effect of the 
performance, we observe that the sum of the coefficients on Performance and 
Performance*Monitor remains positive, which is again is consistent with existing literature (Coval 
and Stafford 1997; Huang, Wei, and Yan 2007). 
While the full sample confirms our prior expectations, we divide the sample into two 
subsamples of positive flow (inflow) and negative flow (outflow) to analyze the effect of the 
presence of the monitor on both sides of the flow. The results are presented in panel (B) of Table 
5. We can observe that the coefficient on the interaction term is still negatively significant for the 
outflows; however, it becomes insignificant for the subsample of inflows. It is likely that investors 
are more attentive to the internal governance mechanisms of the fund during poor, rather than 
strong, periods of performance. In fact, Jenter and Kanaan (2015) document that underperforming 
CEOs of corporations are more likely to be terminated in recessions, while CEOs with superior 
performances are almost unaffected by peer performance. 
Panel (C) reports the regression results by dividing the sample between funds with positive 
performance (one–factor alpha) by funds with negative performance. The results of this regression 
are similar to panel (B), which is consistent with the fact that flow follows the performance of the 
funds. In panel (D), we divide the subsample into retail and institutional flows. For each fund, we 
construct the institutional and retail flow by aggregating the flows from all institutional and retail 
share classes in the fund. While retail investors might not be sufficiently committed and 
sophisticated to track the performance of appointed directors, the institutional investors are likely 
to be more diligent in observing the internal governance of the mutual fund (Evans and 
Fahlenbrach 2012; Fich and Wilkinson–Ryan 2014). Consistent with previous studies, we find that 
the results presented in panel (A) and (B) are driven by institutional funds, and the results for the 
retail investors are much weaker, if not insignificant, in the three models. 
In order to confirm the robustness of the results, in panel (E), we also estimate regressions 
using the matching technique described in section 2.4. Again, the results hold and the coefficient 
on Monitor*Performance is highly and significantly negative, thereby indicating that monitors 
reduce the flow performance sensitivity of funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Fund Flow-performance Sensitivity and Intense Monitors on Board 
 
This table reports the effect of having an intense monitor on board on the flow–performance 
sensitivity of the mutual fund. The observations are at the fund-quarter level, and the dependent 
variable is the fund flow (FundFlow). Four proxies of performance—raw returns, CAPM–
alpha, three–factor alpha in Fama and French (1993), and four–factor alpha in Carhart (1997), 
have been used in models (1) – (4), respectively. Monitor is equal to one if an intense monitor 
on board, and zero otherwise. Monitor*Performance denotes the interaction term between the 
two variables. Panel (A) reports the regression results for the entire sample. Panel (B) breaks 
the sample into funds that have outflows (negative flow) and those that have inflows (positive 
flow) in the preceding quarter. Panel (C) divides the sample of funds with negative flows into 
institutional funds and retails funds. Panel (C) divides the sample into of funds with positive 
one-factor alpha and those with negative one-factor alpha. Panel (D) divides the sample into 
institutional funds and retail funds. Panel (E) reports the results in the matched sample as 
reported in Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. 
 
Panel (A) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Performance Measure Raw Return CAPM alpha Three-factor alpha 
Four-factor 
alpha 
Monitor -0.238*** -0.243*** -0.291** -0.211** 
 (-3.27) (-2.96) (-2.14) (-2.26) 
Monitor*Performance -0.225** -0.258*** -0.242** -0.203** 
 (-2.22) (-3.01) (-1.99) (-2.17) 
Performance 0.453*** 0.356*** 0.420*** 0.327*** 
 (3.57) (2.81) (2.69) (3.23) 
ExpRatio -0.114*** -0.095*** -0.105** -0.124** 
 (-3.14) (-3.16) (-2.20) (-2.11) 
FundSize -0.102*** -0.166*** -0.124*** -0.132*** 
 (-3.47) (-2.86) (-3.18) (-2.84) 
FamilySize -0.094*** -0.056** -0.086*** -0.085*** 
 (-2.70) (-2.02) (-3.02) (-3.13) 
LoadFee -0.352*** -0.364*** -0.284*** -0.233*** 
 (-4.59) (-3.62) (-3.18) (-4.14) 
TurnRatio 0.083* 0.086* 0.075 0.054 
  (1.91) (1.76) (1.11) (0.97) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Family FE YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 
Adjusted R-squared 0.076 0.095 0.088 0.088 
    
Panel (B) 
    
  Negative flow 
Monitor -0.312*** -0.300** -0.305** 
 (-2.86) (-2.34) (-2.14) 
Monitor*Performance -0.318*** -0.316*** -0.325*** 
 (-3.93) (-3.01) (-4.12) 
Performance 0.423*** 0.326*** 0.387*** 
  -2.81 -2.52 -2.43 
Controls YES YES YES 
Family & Time FE YES YES YES 
  Positive flow 
Monitor 0.019** 0.013* 0.010* 
 (1.98) (1.7) (1.83) 
Monitor*Performance 0.134 -0.152 -0.109 
 (0.99) (-0.65) (-0.76) 
Performance 0.518*** 0.620*** 0.587*** 
  (3.48) (3.16) (2.64) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Family & Time FE YES YES YES 
     
Panel (C) 
    
  Negative Performance 
Monitor -0.239*** -0.185*** -0.384*** 
 (-3.25) (-4.32) (-2.58) 
Monitor*Performance -0.190*** -0.094*** -0.205*** 
 (-2.93) (-3.11) (-3.71) 
performance 0.381*** 0.290*** 0.199*** 
  (2.91) (3.18) (3.30) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Family & Time FE YES YES YES 
  Positive Performance 
Monitor 0.029* 0.038* 0.025* 
 (1.73) (1.93) (1.85) 
Monitor*Performance -0.038 -0.013 -0.029 
 (-1.32) (-0.31) (-0.44) 
Performance 0.431*** 0.372*** 0.380*** 
  (-2.88) (-3.12) (-3.34) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Family & Time FE YES YES YES 
      
Panel (D) 
    
  Institutional – Negative flow 
Monitor -0.213** -0.277** -0.304** 
 (-1.98) (-2.08) (-2.16) 
Monitor*Performance -0.426*** -0.476*** -0.412*** 
 (-6.50) (-5.27) (-4.90) 
performance 0.547*** 0.503*** 0.587*** 
  (2.74) (3.1) (2.61) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Family & Time FE YES YES YES 
  Retail – Negative flow 
Monitor 0.062* 0.214 0.187 
 (1.75) (1.14) (0.82) 
Monitor*Performance -0.221 -0.354* -0.383 
 (-0.44) (-1.83) (-1.52) 
Performance 0.734*** 0.642*** 0.663*** 
 (3.44) (2.99) (3.54) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Family & Time FE YES YES YES 
 
Panel (E)  
  Matched Sample – Negative flow 
Monitor -0.334*** -0.323*** -0.281*** 
 (-5.18) (-3.99) (-4.47) 
Monitor*Performance -0.324*** -0.280*** -0.252*** 
 (-4.19) (-3.12) (-2.87) 
Performance 0.498*** 0.652*** 0.581*** 
 (4.86) (3.11) (2.98) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Family & Time FE YES YES YES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4. The return gap of mutual funds and window dressing in the presence of an intense monitor 
Having studied the effects of intense monitors on both internal and external governance of 
mutual funds, now we turn to the possible consequences of having intense monitors on the 
performance attributes of funds. One might argue that changes in fund governance can be 
influential on different aspects of manager’s behavior for several reasons. First, a well–governed 
fund is more likely to have appointed more skilled fund managers already, whose expected returns 
for the fund are superior to other sub–optimal fund managers. Second, the increased likelihood of 
the turnover after a poor performance motivates the fund manager to exert maximum effort. Third, 
the board of directors is also responsible for overseeing personal investments of the fund manager 
(ICI, 1999), which provides them with invaluable information regarding the managers’ risk–taking 
and portfolio selections. Finally, as discussed in Table 3, the presence of an intense monitor on the 
board mitigates the effect of abnormal flow in manager’s turnover, thereby suggesting that the 
board is more capable of distinguishing between abnormal and performance–related flows. In such 
a case, a manager would have more incentives to exert maximal effort on the performance rather 
than other efforts—for example, marketing practices. Consequently, one might expect that better 
internal governance of the mutual fund in the presence of an intense monitor translates into changes 
in certain portfolio characteristics. In this section, we analyze the gap in mutual fund returns in the 
presence of an intense monitor on the board.  
The gap in mutual fund returns between the return of disclosed positions and the reported 
return at the end of the quarter originates from the fact that investors do not observe all the 
manager’s actions. Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008) measure the difference between these 
two returns and find that this return gap is a predictor of fund performance. Return gap has been 
identified as a managerial skill in the literature; however, one can expect that the governance 
practices also affect this factor. A mutual fund manager has frequent meetings with the board of 
directors, but they can happen in between two portfolio disclosures; thus, the actions of the 
manager may remain unobserved. Moreover, fund directors have the responsibility of reviewing 
and approving important financial factors of the funds, such as approving the procedure of 
valuation of securities and trading practices (ICI, 1999), which can affect the mutual funds’ returns. 
Based on the preceding discussion, we now test the how much impact monitors have on the 
return gap of mutual funds. We construct the return gap following the Kacperczyk, Sialm, and 
Zheng (2008) methodology and now test hypothesis 4 by estimating the effect of having a monitor 
on the board on the return gap in a panel regression. Specifically, we estimate the following 
equation:  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝐺𝑎𝑝௜,௧ାଵ =        
                      𝛽ଵ𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟௜,௧ +  𝛽ଶ𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜௜,௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜௜,௧  +  ∑ 𝛾௝𝜃௝,௜,௧ +௝
                                 +    𝜔௧ + 𝜀௜,௧ାଵ                                                                   (11)  
Table 7 reports the results of this regression. Following the literature, we use two return gap 
measures: (1) the raw return gap and (2) the abnormal four–factor return gap. In regression models 
(1) – (4) we include control variables expense ratio (ExpRatio), turnover ratio (TurnRatio), fund 
age, fund size, family size, manager tenure, and manager age. Panel (A) of the table reports the 
results of the regression on the entire sample. It is evident from this table that the presence of a 
monitor on the board is associated with an increase of 39 basis points in the raw return gap, which 
is highly significant and positive, thereby suggesting that the presence of a monitor increases the 
possible “hidden actions” by the manager. In models (5) and (6), we use WindowDressing as the 
dependent variable. According to Agarwal, Gay, and Ling (2014), managers have the incentive to 
make risky bets on performance during a reporting delay period in order to provide positive signals 
to investors who might be skeptical of the manager’s skill. If the fund governance is stronger as a 
result of the presence of an intense monitor, one might expect that the window–dressing activity 
reduces in the presence of an intense monitor. The results of models (5) and (6) provide some 
support for this hypothesis. The coefficient on the intense monitor indicator remains negative and 
significant. In panel (B) of Table 6, we divide the sample into two sub–samples of the positive 
return gap—in which the reported return is higher than the return of disclosed positions—and the 
negative return gap, in which the return of disclosed positions is higher than the return reported by 
the mutual fund. The results presented in panel (B) are interesting. While the coefficient on the 
positive gap turns insignificant, the coefficient sign on the negative gap remains positive and 
significant, thereby suggesting that the results in panel (A) are mostly driven by an improvement 
of negative gaps through better monitoring. Consistent with the results of Table 5, the results of 
panel (B) indicate that this improved governance measure is more likely to limit the negative side 
of performance and have an insignificant effect on the positive side of performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Mutual Fund Return Gap and Intense Monitors on Board 
  
This table reports the effect of having an intense monitor on the board of a mutual fund on the return 
gap. In models (1) – (4), the dependent variable is Gap, which is calculated as the difference 
between reported return and the holding return minus the expense ratio, following Kacperczyk, 
Sialm, and Zheng (2008). Panel (A) reports the results of regressing the return gap on the Monitor 
variable. In models (1) and (2), we use a raw return measure of return gap. In models (3) and (4), 
we use abnormal four-factor return gaps, as in Carhart (1997). In models (5) and (6), the dependent 
variable is the absolute window-dressing measure, which is calculated as the difference between 
the backward holding return of a hypothetical portfolio disclosed at the end of the quarter and the 
actual announced return. In panel (B), we report the results based on two subsamples of positive 
return gaps and negative return gaps. All standard errors are clustered at the family level. The 
observations are at the fund-quarter level.   
Panel (A) 
Dependent Variable Raw Return Gap Abnormal Four-factor Return Gap BHRG 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Monitor -0.039** -0.042* -0.052** -0.047* -0.063** -0.056** 
 (-2.10) (-1.78) (-2.32) (-1.91) (-2.41) (-2.38) 
Loadfee -0.322* -0.255 -0.222 -0.315 -0.016*** -0.021*** 
 (-1.92) (-0.98) (-0.76) (-0.83) (3.45) (2.96) 
TurnRatio 0.005 0.006 0.012 0.009 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.12) (0.28) (0.87) (0.17) (0.59) (0.99) 
FundAge -0.024* -0.030* -0.038* -0.045* 0.039 0.045 
 (-1.64) (-1.79) (-1.66) (-1.95) (0.65) (0.71) 
Institutional -0.073** -0.092** -0.065*** -0.069** -0.036* -0.026* 
 (-2.19) (-2.44) (-2.58) (-2.33) (-1.72) (-1.73) 
Index -0.031** -0.0258** -0.0494** -0.376** -0.105** -0.119* 
 (-2.42) (-2.36) (-2.31) (-2.22) (-2.45) (-1.70) 
FundSize -0.019*** -0.034*** -0.023*** -0.029*** -0.050** -.045* 
 (-4.87) (-3.05) (-4.15) (-4.71) (-2.53) (1.91) 
FamilySize  0.023**  0.034***  0.024* 
 
 (2.48)  (3.06)  (1.81) 
ManagerTenure  0.057**  0.036**  0.025** 
 
 (2.02)  (2.28)  (2.37) 
ManagerAge  0.003  0.003  0.007 
 
 (0.47)  (0.44)  (0.58) 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.025 0.028 
 
 
  
Panel (B) 
  Positive Gap 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Monitor 0.017 0.029 0.013 
 -0.25 -0.62 -1.09 
Controls YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES 
  Negative Gap 
Monitor -0.042** -0036* -0.043** 
 -2.05 -1.66 -1.98 
Controls YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5. The holding horizon of mutual funds and intense monitors 
In the previous section, we provided evidence that when mutual funds have an intense monitor 
on their board, the manager is less likely to have undesirable hidden actions that place investors in 
a disadvantage. Thus, one might expect that the board is restricting the manager’s excess activity, 
which can turn into longer holding horizons, as formalized in hypothesis H4. In this section, we 
test this hypothesis by estimating the following regression equation: 
       𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛௧ାଵ  =   𝛽ଵ𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟௜,௧ +  ∑ 𝛾௝𝜃௝,௜,௧   +     𝜔௧ + 𝜀௜,௧ାଵ௝                              (12)
 where HoldingHorizon is calculated on the basis of the measures described earlier, following 
Lan, Moneta, and Wermers (2015), and other variables are as defined before. The null hypothesis 
is that the presence of a monitor has no effect on the holding horizon of the mutual fund.  
In Table 8, we report the results of estimating the above regression. The coefficient on Monitor 
is positive and significant; thus, we can reject the null hypothesis. Models (1) – (4) report the 
estimations based on using different measures of holding horizon, and the results are found to be 
robust for all the models. These results suggest that the presence of an intense monitor is associated 
with higher levels of holding horizon of the mutual fund. There are two possible explanations for 
such longer horizons. First, as was evident in Table 6, the presence of an intense monitor is linked 
with lower outflow performance sensitivity for the fund. Subsequently, on average, a mutual fund 
manager will feel less pressure to liquidate her positions in case of a temporary market decline in 
her positions and can simply hold on and sell while the market turns around. Second, as evident 
from Table 7, a board with higher levels of monitoring inhibits the manager from unnecessary 
trading, which can translate into lower turnover and higher holding horizons.  
 
 
Table 8: Mutual Fund Holding Horizons and Intense Monitors on Board 
This table reports the effects of having an intense monitor on board on the holding horizon of a 
mutual fund. Columns (1)–(4) report the results of estimating the regression with different 
holding horizon measures as dependent variable, which are (1) Simple Holding Horizon, (2) 
FIFO Horizon Measure, (3) Ex-Ante Simple Measure, and (4) Duration Measure, respectively, 
as defined in Lan, Moneta, and Wermers (2015). NumberStocks is the number of stocks in the 
portfolio of the mutual fund. ManagerTenure is the manager’s tenure in the mutual fund. 
ManagerAge is the log of manager’s age. ExpRatio is the expense ratio for the mutual fund. 
Observations are at the quarter-fund level. Quarter fixed effects and family fixed effects are 
included in all the models. The standard errors are clustered at family level. 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Holding Horizon Measure SHH FIFO EAS DM 
Monitor 0.0249** 0.0328*** 0.0331*** 0.0451** 
 (2.15) (2.88) (3.35) (2.46) 
ExpRatio(%) -0.022*** -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.027*** 
 (-4.10) (-5.41) (-3.19) (-4.75) 
FundAge 0.366*** 0.336*** 0.498*** 0.571*** 
 (2.85) (2.97) (2.72) (2.77) 
LoadFee(%) 0.314** 0.399*** 0.257*** 0.217*** 
 (2.18) (3.43) (2.96) (3.52) 
NumberStocks 0.0343*** 0.048*** 0.042*** 0.029*** 
 (3.47) (4.79) (3.29) (2.93) 
FundSize 0.964*** 0.653*** 0.604*** 0.721*** 
 (5.60) (4.73) (5.21) (3.24) 
TurnRatio(%) -0.049** -0.043** -0.048* -0.041** 
 (-2.11) (-1.99) (-1.97) (-2.03) 
ManagerTenure 0.193* 0.178 0.185* 0.189* 
 (1.74) (1.62) (1.87) (1.78) 
ManagerAge 0.217** 0.241*** 0.322** 0.220** 
 (2.28) (2.88) (1.97) (2.22) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Family FE YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 
Adjusted R-squared 0.043 0.042 0.039 0.032 
 
While the literature has taken holding horizon and return gap as proxies for managerial skill, 
the results that we presented here provide some evidence that such characteristics are not merely 
managerial skills and can be affected by governance measures as well. 
5.6. Managerial risk–taking and intense monitors 
The results of the previous sections suggest that boards with intense monitors restrict 
managerial freedom in hidden trading; thus, one might expect that such restriction affects the levels 
of risk–taking by the manager. In this section, we formally test whether adding an intense monitor 
to the board changes the risk–taking behavior of the fund. To this end, we estimate a regression 
equation that captures the difference of the risk–taking behavior between funds with intense 
monitors on their board and funds without them. Following previous literature (Massa and Patgiri 
2009), we take the fund’s return volatility as a measure of managerial risk–taking and estimate the 
following regression equation: 
𝜎௜,௧ାଵ = 𝛽ଵ ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟௜,௧ + ∑ 𝛽௜,௝𝜎௜,௧,௝ + 𝜔௧ + 𝜖௜,௧ାଵ௝                       (13) 
where the 𝜎௜,௧ାଵ denotes the fund i’s excess return volatility at time t+1, measured by the fund’s 
return volatility in excess of the average return volatility of all funds following the same style, and 
other variables are as defined before. The coefficient of interest here is 𝛽ଵ, which allows us to 
measure the risk–taking behavior of the manager in the presence of a monitor. 
Table 9 reports the results of estimating equation (13). In models (1) and (2), the dependent 
variable is the fund’s excessive volatility. In models (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the 
fund’s Sharpe ratio. Consistent with our prior results, we observe that the coefficient on the 
Monitor is negative and significant for the fund’s excessive volatility and is positive and significant 
at 10% for the Sharpe ratio. This suggests that the presence of intense monitors is associated with 
less risk–taking but does not harm the performance, which results in an improved Sharpe ratio.
 Table 9: Managerial Risk–taking and Intense Monitors on Board 
This table reports the results of a difference-in-difference model to estimate the effects of hiring an intense monitor on the fund’s 
risk–taking. The dependent variable in models (1) and (2) is fund excessive volatility, which is the volatility of the fund over the 
average volatility of the funds in the same investment style. The dependent variable in Models (3) and (4) is the fund’s Sharpe ratio. 
Monitor is an indicator equal to one if the board hires an intense monitor, and zero otherwise. LaggedVol is the volatility of the fund 
in the prior quarter.  
  Full Sample Matched Sample Full Sample Matched Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat          
Monitor -0.0021** (-2.16) -0.0014* (-1.77) 0.031* (1.70) 0.017* (1.76) 
         
FundSize 0.0031** (2.08) 0.0025** (1.97) -0.016* (-1.94) -0.007* (-1.88) 
         
FamilySize 0.0024*** (2.66) 0.0013*** (4.11) -0.035* (-1.81) -0.023 (-1.65) 
         
FlowAlpha -0.0008* (-1.85) -0.0003* (-1.65) 0.024 (0.73) 0.035 (1.42) 
         
FundAge -0.0021** (-2.50) -0.0024** (-2.35) 0.036 (1.55) 0.049 (0.27) 
         
LaggedVol 0.2847*** (3.78) 0.3389*** (4.01) -0.161*** (-3.30) -0.096*** (-3.08) 
         
TurnRatio 0.0034 (0.71) 0.0017 (1.18) -0.062 (-0.76) -0.077 (-1.43) 
                  
Number of Observations 59,736 19,668 59,736 19,668 
Family FE YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
R-Squared 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.15 
 
5.7. Robustness tests 
In previous subsections, we observed that the specific experience of mutual fund directors can 
have a significant consequence on the different attributes of funds. In this subsection, we further 
investigate the validity of previous results by testing the robustness of the results with different 
proxies and settings. 
[1] Different proxies for intense monitors 
In addition to the three proxies defined previously, we also consider other possible measures 
that can determine the degree of intensity and experience of a director in her monitoring duties. 
First, consistent with Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2011), we consider the NominExperience 
variable, which is an indicator of a director who has been on the nominating committee of a 
corporation board for at least three years prior to joining the mutual fund, and the 
GovernExperience variable, which is an indicator of a director who has been on the Governance 
Committee of a corporation board for at least three years prior to joining the mutual fund. 
Moreover, since previous literature has indicated the value of CEO directors on corporation boards 
(Faleye 2011; Fahlenbrach, Minton, and Pan 2011), we also define CEOExperience as an indicator 
of a director who has been the CEO of an external company prior to joining the mutual fund for at 
least three years. Table 10 reports and compares the summary statistics of these new proxies with 
the aforementioned proxies, and Table 11 reports the results of running the regressions in previous 
sections on each individual proxy, while each of models (1)–(6) uses a single proxy for intense 
monitors such as the Monitor variable. The performance measure used here is the DGTW adjusted 
returns of the mutual fund. Panel (A) reports the results of the turnover–performance sensitivity 
for the manager of the mutual funds. The dependent variable here is the forced turnover indicator, 
which is equal to one if there is a managerial turnover for the fund in the quarter, and zero 
otherwise. 
Panel (B) reports the results of regressing the fund flows against mutual fund variables. We 
observe that the coefficient of interest, Monitor*Performance is significantly negative for 
GovernExperience and CEOExperience measures, which is consistent with the results reported in 
Table 6, thereby suggesting a decreased level of flow performance sensitivity in the presence of 
intense monitors. The coefficient of NominExperience is also negative, although insignificant. 
Panel (C) presents the results of regressing the abnormal four–factor return gap on our monitor 
measures. Panel (D) presents the results of regressing the FIFO holding horizon measure against 
the monitor variables with different definitions. Among the newly defined measures, we observe 
that the coefficient of GovernExperience for panel (D) is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
The fact that results of our previous tests do not hold for the newly defined measures might not be 
surprising after all. Based on the responsibilities and duties of the fund directors, it is possible that 
the experience in the audit committee of corporations is most relevant to the work required on the 
fund’s board. It is worth mentioning that Ferris and Yan (2007) report that over 90% of the mutual 
funds do indeed have an audit committee on their boards, which is again suggestive of the 
relevance of audit experience for a fund director. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Alternative Proxies For Intense Monitors 
This table reports the summary statistics of the data using fund-quarter observations between 
January 2003 and December 2015, with different proxies for intense monitors. AuditExperience 
indicates the presence of a director who has been on the audit committee of a corporation board for 
at least three years. NominExpereince indicates the presence of a director who has been on the 
nomination committee of a corporation board for at least three years. GovernExperience indicates 
the presence of a director who has been on the governance committee of a corporation board for at 
least three years. CEOExperience indicates the presence of a director who has been the CEO of a 
corporation prior to joining the mutual fund for at least three years. 
Variable  N Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
    AuditExperience 59,736 0.08 0.11 0 0 0 
    GIMlowest 59,736 0.05 0.13 0 0 0 
    TurnoverExperience 59,736 0.03 0.07 0 0 0 
    NominExperience 59,736 0.06 0.08 0 0 0 
    GovernExperience 59,736 0.09 0.12 0 0 0 
    CEOExperience 59,736 0.07 0.11 0 0 0 
Table 11: Alternative Measures for Intense Monitors 
  
This table reports the results of running regressions in previous sections, with each individual proxy for intense monitors. Panel (A) reports the results of regressing 
equation (14) with individual proxies. Models (1) – (6) report the results based on each individual measure of intense monitors. Here, the dependent variable is 
the ForcedTurnover measure, which is equal to one if the fund has fired a manager, and zero otherwise. Panel (B) reports the results of regressing equation (10) 
with individual proxies. Here, the dependent variable is FundFlow. Panel (C) reports the results of running equation (12) with individual proxies, with the 
Abnormal Four Factor return gap measure as the dependent variable. Panel (D) reports the results of running equation (13), with the FIFO holding horizon measure 
as the dependent variable. Monitor is an indicator that takes the value of one whenever there is an intense monitor (corresponding to each model’s proxy). 
Observations are the fund-quarter level.  
Panel (A): Dependent Variable: Forced Turnover 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Monitor Measure AuditExperience TurnoverExperience GIMlowest NominExperience GovernExperience CEOExperience        
Monitor*Performance*WindowDressing -0.025** -0.046** -0.004* -0.016 -0.020* 0.007 
 (-1.98) (-2.07) (-1.85) (-0.87) (-1.68) (0.96) 
Monitor*WindowDressing 0.003** 0.005* 0.005* 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (2.05) (1.71) (1.66) (1.11) (1.25) (0.78) 
Performance*WindowDressing 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.011 
 (0.39) (1.15) (0.47) (0.34) (0.63) (1.02) 
Monitor*Performance -0.053* -0.022 -0.013* 0.005 -0.027* -0.016 
 (-1.65) (-1.50) (-1.70) (0.82) (-1.78) (-0.58) 
Monitor 0.041* 0.024* 0.031 0.011 0.026 0.018 
  (1.93) (1.78) (1.58) (1.43) (1.54) (1.36) 
Controls and Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 
 
 
Panel (B): Dependent Variable: FundFlow 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Monitor Measure AuditExperience TurnoverExperience GIMlowest NominExperience GovernExperience CEOExperience 
       
Monitor -0.312** -0.212** -0.215* -0.175 -0.231* -0.191* 
 (-2.54) (-2.46) (-1.76) (-1.52) (-1.92) (-1.59) 
Monitor*Performance -0.277** -0.257** -0.221** -0.199 -0.184* -0.296* 
 (-2.18) (-1.97) (-2.04) (-0.81) (-1.83) (-1.80) 
Performance 0.449*** 0.383*** 0.407*** 0.512*** 0.481*** 0.318*** 
  (4.11) (3.09) (3.34) (2.76) (4.00) (3.30) 
       
Controls and Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 
Panel (C): Dependent Variable: Abnormal Four-factor Return Gap 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Monitor Measure AuditExperience TurnoverExperience GIMlowest NominExperience GovernExperience CEOExperience        
Monitor -0.031* -0.022* -0.024 -0.005 -0.021 -0.011 
  (-1.88) (-1.65) (-0.89) (-1.10) (-1.59) (-1.21) 
Controls and Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 
       
       
Panel (D): FIFO Horizon Measure 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Monitor Measure AuditExperience TurnoverExperience GIMlowest NominExperience GovernExperience CEOExperience        
Monitor 0.0039* 0.0037* 0.0011* 0.0019 0.0017* 0.0013 
  
(1.83) (1.66) (1.76) (1.61) (1.92) (1.17) 
Controls and Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 
[2] Alternative regression models 
In this section, we run the previous tests in a DID framework, in which we compare the effect 
of adding an intense monitor to a fund before and after her addition. In particular, we use the 
following equation: 
   𝑌௜,௧ାଵ =  𝛽ଵ𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟௜,௧ +  𝛽ଶ𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽ଷ𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 +  Σ௝𝛾௝  𝜃௜,௝,௧ +  𝜔௧ +  𝛼௜ +  𝜖௜,௧ାଵ     (14) 
where Y is the dependent variable of interest, and Post is an indicator, which takes value zero 
before the employment of the intense monitor and one after the employment of the intense monitor. 
The coefficient of interest here is 𝛽ଷ, which indicates the difference associated with the addition 
of a director. The results of running equation (14) are presented in Table 12. In panel (A) of Table 
12, the dependent variable is FundFlow. We observe that the coefficient on 
Monitor*Post*Performance is negative and significant in models (1) – (3), thereby suggesting that 
after the addition of an intense monitor to the board, the flow of the fund becomes less sensitive to 
its performance. In panel (B), we estimate equation (14) with the manager’s hidden actions as the 
dependent variable, in which we again use the raw return gap, the abnormal four–factor return gap, 
and the window–dressing measure as proxies for the manager’s hidden actions in models (1)–(3), 
respectively. We observe that the coefficient on the Monitor*Post is negative in all the models, 
thereby suggesting that there is reduced levels of hidden activity after an intense monitor joins the 
board. The coefficient on the first model is statistically significant. In panel (C), the dependent 
variable is the fund’s holding horizons measure by the SHH, FIFO, EAS, and DM variables. Again, 
we observe a positive and mildly significant coefficient for the interaction variable in models (1) 
and (2), which provides more evidence that the portfolio holding horizon of the fund increases 
after addition of an intense monitor to the board. In panel (D), the dependent variable is the fund’s 
excessive volatility. Panel (D) shows that the coefficient on Monitor is positive, which implies that 
funds that end up hiring intense monitors had slightly higher excessive volatility before hiring 
monitors as compared to funds that did not hire such monitors. Moreover, the coefficient on Post 
is highly significant and negative, which implies that after hiring, there was a decline in the amount 
of risk that mutual funds undertook. Finally, the coefficient on the interaction term Post*Monitor 
is highly negative and significant, which is an indication that funds that hired monitors did 
experience a significant decline in the amount of their excess fund return volatility. In model (2), 
we run the regression again with the matched sample reported in panel (A) in Table 4. We observe 
that the results hold for this matched sample as well, which provides more support for rejecting 
the null hypothesis that hiring an intense monitor has no effect on the degree of risk that a fund 
undertakes. In the Appendix section, we also report the results of the difference–in–difference 
regressions with a [–12, +24] event window. The results are mostly consistent with previous 
findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Difference-in-difference Regressions 
  
This table reports the results of regressing dependent variables in a difference-in-difference 
framework. Post is an indicator of time, which is equal to zero before the addition of an intense monitor 
to the board and equal to one after the addition. In panel (A), the dependent variable is the FundFlow 
of the fund. In panel (B), the dependent variable is the manager’s hidden actions, which is the raw 
return gap, abnormal return gap, and the BHRG window-dressing measure. In panel (C), the dependent 
variable is the fund’s holding horizon measured by SHH, FIFO, EAS, and DM variables, in models 
(1) – (4), respectively. The dependent variable in panel (D) is the fund’s excessive volatility. 
 
Panel (A) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Performance measure Raw Return 
CAPM 
alpha 
3-factor 
alpha 
4-factor 
alpha 
DGTW 
alpha 
      
Monitor -0.146** -0.184** -0.097** -0.208** -0.131** 
 (-2.11) (-2.07) (-1.98) (-2.56) (-2.13) 
Post -0.021* -0.053** -0.047* -0.032** -0.023** 
 (-1.78) (-2.10) (-2.44) (-2.13) (-2.45) 
Performance 0.314*** 0.482*** 0.412*** 0.525*** 0.358*** 
 (3.39) (2.84) (4.01) (3.75) (3.29) 
Post*Monitor -0.116* -0.165** -0.217** -0.100* -0.205* 
 (-1.80) (-1.99) (-2.04) (-1.88) (-1.65) 
Post*Performance 0.028 0.037 0.089 0.060 0.084 
 (1.19) (0.90) (0.32) (0.69) (0.48) 
Monitor*Performance -0.164** -0.128** -0.291** -0.338* -0.273* 
 (-2.25) (-2.44) (-2.00) (-1.93) (-1.83) 
Monitor*Post*Performance -0.342** -0.329* -0.419* -0.348 -0.404 
 (-2.17) (-1.75) (-1.80) (-1.61) (-1.53) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Time and Family Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 59,736 
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 
 
 
 Panel (B) 
Dependent Variable Raw Return Gap Abnormal four-factor Return Gap BHRG 
  (1) (3) (5) 
Monitor -0.026** -0.033* -0.036 
 (-2.56) (-1.86) (-1.58) 
Post -0.065* -0.052* -0.034 
 (-1.75) (-1.75) (-1.01) 
Monitor*Post -0.029* -0.023 -0.018 
 (-1.77) (-1.08) (-0.78) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Family & Time FE YES YES YES 
 
Panel (C) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Holding Horizon Measure SHH FIFO EAS DM 
     
Monitor 0.0209* 0.0304 0.0342* 0.0364 
 (1.69) (1.46) (1.87) (1.31) 
Post 0.0135 0.0168 0.0136 0.0120 
 (0.89) (0.70) (0.92) (1.26) 
Monitor*Post 0.0284* 0.0200* 0.0249 0.0237 
 (1.65) (1.86) (1.45) (1.58) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Time and Family Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
 
 
 
 
Panel (D) 
Dependent variable Full Sample Matched Sample 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Monitor 0.0048* (1.77) 0.0037* (1.84) 
     
Post -0.0025** (-2.30) -0.0191* (-1.90) 
     
Post * Monitor -0.0033*** (-3.28) -0.0264*** (-2.61) 
Number of observations  59,736 19,668 
Controls  YES YES 
Time and Family Fixed Effects YES YES 
R-Squared 0.35 0.48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[3] Changes in performance after managerial turnover 
In section (5.2), we indicated the possibility that intense monitors might overreach in their 
monitoring responsibilities by focusing on recent short–term performance of the manager rather 
than evaluating her performance based on a longer horizon. Such short–termism can lead to sub–
optimal termination of the managers tenure and prove costly to the mutual fund. Jin and Scherbina 
(2010) have documented that after a managerial turnover, newly added managers improve the 
performance of the fund by selling the losing stocks that the previous manager held onto for too 
long, possibly as a result of her disposition bias. However, if the manager is terminated based on 
her short–term performance, there is a possibility that the poor performance has been a result of a 
down cycle in the portfolio that would have reverse in future if the manager would have stayed in 
the fund and continue with his investment. 
In order to investigate this possibility, we compare the changes in the performance of mutual 
funds after a managerial turnover between the funds with intense monitors on their board versus 
the funds with no intense monitors. To this end, for each managerial turnover event, we match a 
continuing manager based on the manager’s age, tenure, fund investment style, ranked 
performance, and portfolio turnover from a fund with no intense monitor. We then estimate a 
difference–in–difference regression as 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒௜,௧ାଵ =  𝛽ଵ𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟௜,௧ +  𝛽ଶ𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 +  𝛽ଷ𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 +  Σ௝𝛾௝ 𝜃௜,௝,௧ +
 𝜔௧ +  𝛼௜ + 𝜖௜,௧ାଵ                                                                                                              (15)                                             
Where PostTurnover is an indicator which takes value one after a turnover event and zero 
otherwise. Other variables are defined as before. The coefficient of interest here is 
Monitor*PostTurnover, which compares the effect of a managerial turnover on the performance 
between funds with intense monitors versus funds without intense monitors.  
The results of this regression are reported in Table 13. First, it is evident that the coefficient 
on the PostTurnover variable is positive and significant, which means that, overall, after a 
managerial turnover, the performance of the fund improves. However, we also observe that the 
coefficient on Monitor*PostTurnover is negative, thereby suggesting that—on average—the effect 
of managerial turnover is less effective, possibly because the intense monitors have overreacted to 
short–term performances and prematurely terminated the manager. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 13: Changes in Mutual Fund Performance Subsequent to a Managerial Turnover 
This table reports the results of running a difference–in–difference regression for the performance of the mutual 
funds after a managerial turnover event. Monitor is an indicator that takes the value of one if there is an intense 
monitor at the event of turnover, and zero otherwise. PostTurnover is an indicator that takes the value of one after 
the turnover event, and zero beforehand. Models (1) – (3) cover the event window from one year prior to one year 
after the event. Models (4) – (6) cover the event window from two years prior and two years after the turnover 
event. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
DGTW 
alpha 
CAPM 
alpha 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
DGTW 
alpha 
CAPM 
alpha 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Monitor 0.0019 0.0004 0.0154* 0.0028 0.0012 0.0232* 
 (1.27) (1.33) (1.88) (1.03) (0.81) (1.80) 
PostTurnover 0.0061** 0.0083* 0.0210* 0.0084* 0.0069* 0.0167* 
 (1.97) (1.92) (1.76) (1.86) (1.89) (1.93) 
Monitor*PostTurnover -0.0037* -0.0021* -0.006* -0.0018* -0.0009 -0.005 
  (-1.92) (-1.81) (-1.83) (-1.89) (-1.65) (-1.58) 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time and Family FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 2,792 2,792 2,792 2,792 2,792 2,792 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
Traditional firm theory places reduced emphasis on the role of the board of directors in mutual 
funds and argues that the simplicity of a fund’s operations as well as the simplicity of available 
external governance mechanisms—that is, investors’ option to redeem their investments from the 
fund—is sufficient for monitoring the control process (Fama and Jensen 1983). However, the 
mutual fund trading scandals of 2003 caused fund governance to return to the forefront. Such 
scandals demonstrated that external governance mechanisms cannot fully monitor the internal 
processes of a fund, which is potentially caused by market imperfections such as information 
asymmetry between investors and the fund management as well as redemption costs such as load 
fees, redemption fees, and capital gain taxes (Philips 2003). Interestingly, such concerns were 
already noticed upon passing the ICA of 1940 and Investment Advisors Act of 1940, which led to 
the initiation of the Division of Investment Management in SEC (Tufano and Sevick 1997); 
however, the continued abuse of governance in mutual funds suggests that the established 
requirements have not been effective in prohibiting governance failures.  
In this study, we argued that specific directors with intense monitoring skills can have 
significant effects on the attributes of a mutual fund. We showed that funds that were involved in 
a scandal are more likely to employ intense monitors. Moreover, we showed that mutual funds 
with such directors on their boards are associated with higher turnover–performance sensitivity, 
lower investor’s flow–performance sensitivity, and lower levels of hidden managerial activities. 
On the other hand, we provided some evidence suggesting that intense monitors are likely to 
exhibit myopic behavior by focusing only on short–term performance, thereby resulting in sub–
optimal terminations of the fund manager. We found some evidence suggesting that subsequent to 
a managerial turnover, funds with intense monitors on their board experience less improvement in 
their performance compared to funds with no intense monitors. The results of our study suggest 
that individual traits and previous experience of mutual fund directors has considerable effect on 
different aspects of the funds.  
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Appendix I: DID Regressions [-12,+24] 
This table reports the results of regressing dependent variables in a DID framework. Post is an 
indicator of time which is equal to zero before the addition of an intense monitor to the board and is 
equal to one after the addition. In panel (A) the dependent variable is the FundFlow of the fund. In 
panel (B), the dependent variable is manager’s hidden actions which is the raw return gap, abnormal 
return gap, and the BHRG window dressing measure. In panel (C) the dependent variable is the fund’s 
holding horizon measured by SHH, FIFO, EAS, and DM variables, in models (1) to (4), respectively. 
The dependent variable in panel (D) is fund’s excessive volatility. 
 
Panel (A) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
performance measure Raw Return 
CAPM 
alpha 
3-factor 
alpha 
4-factor 
alpha 
DGTW 
alpha 
      
Monitor -0.094** -0.153** -0.101** -0.025** -0.152** 
 (-2.35) (-1.97) (-2.12) (-2.04) (-2.24) 
Post -0.055*** -0.071** -0.065* -0.063** -0.014** 
 (-3.85) (-2.40) (-1.90) (-2.51) (-2.03) 
Performance 0.159*** 0.255*** 0.311*** 0.406*** 0.218*** 
 (2.97) (3.18) (2.85) (4.11) (2.99) 
Post*Monitor -0.253* -0.409* -0.606 -0.365** -0.207 
 (-1.67) (-1.95) (-1.38) (-2.12) (-1.16) 
Post*Performance 0.052 0.036 0.095 0.042 0.040 
 (0.91) (0.82) (0.32) (1.15) (0.40) 
Monitor*Performance -0.355** -0.259* -0.154** -0.245* -0.354* 
 (-2.26) (-1.81) (-2.32) (-1.89) (-1.79) 
Monitor*Post*Performance -0.426** -0.396* -0.341* -0.365** -0.258* 
 (-2.03) (-1.94) (-1.65) (-1.99) (-1.66) 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES 
Family & Time FE YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 
 
 
    
 
      
      
      
      
      
Panel (B) 
Dependent Variable Raw Return Gap Abnormal four-factor Return Gap BHRG 
  (1) (3) (5) 
Monitor -0.043*** -0.051** -0.074* 
 (-3.05) (-2.23) (-1.82) 
Post -0.032* -0.097** -0.046* 
 (-1.72) (-2.11) (-2.35) 
Monitor*Post -0.065* -0.047* -0.034 
 (-1.75) (-1.91) (-1.60) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Family & Time FE YES YES YES 
 
 
 
 
